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Abstract:  The hold-up problem has played a central role in the study of firm boundaries, which 
is a fundamental element of the economic study of organizations. We study a previously unex-
plored mechanism by which integration between two parties could resolve the problem. Based on 
the social identity theory, we conjecture that group identity strengthens agents’ altruistic prefer-
ences towards group members, and this helps resolve the hold-up problem. We test this conjec-
ture in a laboratory experiment. Our subjects were randomly divided into two teams and asked to 
wear their team uniform. Task 1 required them to answer questions about trivia, where the sub-
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conjectures. 
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1.  Introduction. 
A fundamental question in the literature on the theory of the firm is how integration between two 
parties helps resolve the problem of inefficiency associated with relation-specific investment 
(often referred to as the “hold-up problem”). In this paper we focus on group identity, a central 
concept in social psychology, as a key element in our exploration of this important research 
question in the economic study of organizations.
1
 According to the social identity theory, cate-
gorization of individuals as group members leads them to display in-group favoritism (Turner, 
1975; Tajfel, 1978; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Under integration, parties classify themselves as 
members of the same organization and share common goals, leadership, values, and practices. 
Organizational identification is often strengthened through the manipulation of symbols, tradi-
tions, and corporate culture in general (Ashforth and Mael, 1989).
2
 Organizational identification 
is a specific form of social (or group) identification, which decreases the level of opportunism 
between members and facilitates better coordination and communication (Turner, 1982, 1984; 
Ashforth and Mael, 1989; Kogut and Zander, 1996).  
We propose that group identity, which is present when two parties are integrated within the same 
organizational boundary, plays a critical role in resolving the hold-up problem, and we test our 
conjectures in the controlled environment of a laboratory experiment, which allows us to clearly 
identify the effects of group identity on investment incentives. 
Under the standard setup, relation-specific investment in bilateral trade creates a surplus to be 
shared between two parties because the value of such investment is appreciably lower in any use 
other than supporting the transaction between the two parties. This surplus-sharing leads to the 
problem of inefficiency in a world of incomplete contracts, and the central theme of the theory of 
                                                             
1 Hart (1995), for example, points out that a long-standing issue in organization theory concerns the determinants of 
the boundaries of firms. 
2 For example, Phil Knight, the founder of Nike, and many of his employees have the Nike “swoosh” logo tattooed 
on their calves (Camerer and Malmendier, 2007). 
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the firm is that integration between the two parties mitigates or resolves this inefficiency. The 
property-rights theory has focused on asset ownership as a critical element of the mechanism 
through which integration affects investment incentives (see Section 2.1 for details). We add to 
the literature by experimentally investigating group identity as another critical, and yet 
previously unexplored, element that contributes to the resolution of the hold-up problem.  
Experimental economists have recently found that group identity strengthens other-regarding be-
haviour among group members. Additionally, a number of experimental studies show that people 
exhibit other-regarding behaviour under various setups of the hold-up problem. Based on these 
findings we conjecture that group identity strengthens agents’ altruistic preferences, which in 
turn help resolve or mitigate the hold-up problem. In our experiment the seller decides whether 
or not to invest $F. If no investment is made, the game ends. If the seller invests, $G (> F) is 
made available to be split between the seller and the buyer. The buyer then makes a take-it-or-
leave-it offer of $p to split $G. The seller can receive $p by accepting the offer, in which case the 
buyer receives $G – p. If the seller rejects the offer, $G disappears and neither party receives any 
additional money. In this game, the seller does not invest if he and the buyer care only about 
their own monetary payoff, leading to inefficiency. ( Note that the investment is efficient given  
G–F >0). However, the seller may choose to invest in the presence of other-regarding preferen-
ces.  
Prior to the game, we randomly divide the subjects into two teams, which we call Yellow and 
Orange. We then let members of the same team wear the same colour t-shirts and help each other 
through on-line chat to answer questions about trivia. These design features are intended to 
create and strengthen group identity through categorization of subjects (Yellow Team and 
Orange Team), usage of symbols (t-shirts), and cooperation to achieve the same goal (questions 
about trivia). We then compare subjects’ behaviour in two treatments, one where each subject is 
anonymously paired with another subject of the same team, and the second where each subject 
on one team is paired with another subject of the other team.  
We hypothesize that the seller is more likely to invest in the same-team treatment because the 
induced group identity between the seller and the buyer strengthens their altruistic preferences, 
giving the seller, in turn, higher incentives to invest. Findings from our experiment support this 
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hypothesis. We observe that: (i) sellers invested more often when paired with buyers from their 
own team than when paired with buyers from the other team, and (ii) buyers’ offers to sellers 
from their own team were higher than to sellers from the other team. 
The present paper contributes to the experimental economics literature by presenting the first 
experimental evidence of the effects of group identity on the hold-up problem. Due to the explo-
ratory nature of our project, we test our conjecture in a laboratory experiment, which allows for 
increased control in the stylized and context-free environment of the lab. This research strategy 
enables us to clearly identify the incentives faced by individual decision-makers and to isolate 
confounds otherwise present in the field where transactions are repeated, reputation-building 
plays an important role, and where the results are possibly influenced by the existing institutional 
setup.
3
  
Our finding contributes to the theory of the firm literature by indicating that group identity has a 
potential to act as a channel through which integration between two parties can resolve or 
mitigate the hold-up problem. It is widely recognized that mergers often fail in reality. Weber 
and Camerer (2003) used laboratory experiments to explore merger failure due to conflicting 
organizational cultures. In their experiments, they allowed subjects in non-integrated “firms” to 
develop a culture, and then merged two firms together to find that performance decreases 
following the merger.  Although related, the focus of our study is different from theirs. Namely, 
we focus on the comparison of integration and non-integration, as two alternative governance 
structures, in the context of the hold-up problem, but not on the effects of the integration of two 
parties that had previously been separate entities. Our study should therefore be viewed as 
complementing Weber and Camerer’s in studying the effects of integration.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a more detailed discussion on 
our contributions to three relevant strands of literature. Section 3 presents the framework and 
hypotheses and explains our experimental design and procedures. Section 4 presents the results. 
Section 5 presents two additional treatments exploring the impact of weak social identity induced 
                                                             
3 This is not to say that the results of a laboratory experiment are not influenced by the experimental design and 
chosen parameters, but rather that field experimentation in naturally occurring market conditions is an important 
second step in evaluating the insights obtained from the lab. 
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only by t-shirts and a neutral baseline treatment in which there are no teams at all. Section 6 
offers concluding remarks. 
 
2.  Literature review. 
This paper builds on earlier work of three types: (a) a large body of research on the theory of the 
firm, (b) the social psychology and experimental economics research on group identity, and (c) 
the experimental economics literature on the hold-up problem. In this section, we discuss our 
contributions to these three strands of literature. 
2.1.  The theory of the firm literature. 
The literature on the theory of the firm, which originated with Coase’s (1937) seminal essay, 
now spans a large body of research. Gibbons (2005) clearly defined and compared four theories 
of the firm, among which relation-specific investment plays a critical role in rent-seeking theory 
(Williamson, 1971, 1979, 1985; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978) and the property-rights the-
ory (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995).
4
 In the rent-seeking theory of 
the firm, a key element is individually optimal but socially destructive haggling over surplus (or 
“appropriable quasi-rents”) that is created by relation-specific investment. Under nonintegration, 
two parties are unable to prevent this inefficient haggling induced by appropriable quasi-rents, 
while under integration their incentives are aligned and the inefficient outcome can thus be 
avoided. The theory asserts that larger appropriable quasi-rents make integration more likely, and 
a number of empirical studies supported this prediction (see, e.g., Shelanski and Klein, 1995 for 
a survey).  
In the property-rights theory, ownership of non-human assets is the defining characteristic of 
firms in a world with incomplete contracts, where ownership conveys “residual rights of control” 
—that is, all the decision rights not specified in a contract. In contrast to the rent-seeking theory, 
the property-rights theory assumes efficient bargaining irrespective of whether the two parties 
are integrated or not, and requires non-contractible relation-specific investments. Efficient bar-
                                                             
4 Other two theories identified by Gibbons are the incentive-theory of the firm and the adaptation theory of the firm, 
in which relation-specific investment does not play major roles. Description and comparison of the two theories 
presented below heavily rely on Gibbons (2005). See Holmström and Roberts (1998) for another excellent 
discussion on the theory of the firm. 
 5 
 
gaining then causes the parties to share the surplus from their relation-specific investments. Each 
party’s asset ownership determines that party’s surplus share, which in turn determines that par-
ty’s investment incentive. If it is important to maximize one party’s investment, then that party 
should own all the assets (integration), whereas if both parties’ investment incentives are import-
ant, then dividing the assets between the parties (nonintegration) will lead to an efficient 
outcome. 
One of the key contributions of the property-rights theory, pioneered by Grossman and Hart 
(1986), was that it gave a unified account of the costs and benefits of integration (Holmström and 
Roberts, 1998; Gibbons, 2005). However, in reality, incentives for relation-specific investment 
are provided by a variety of means, of which ownership is but one, as pointed out by Holmström 
and Roberts (1998). Their paper thus calls for taking a much broader view of the firm and the 
determination of its boundaries, and suggests there might exist various other mechanisms to be 
considered. Holmström and Roberts proposed that the long-term and repeated nature of the inter-
action between relevant parties was another important mechanism that affects the incentive to 
undertake relation-specific investments, pointing to the traditional procurement and subcontract-
ing practices in the Japanese automobile industry as an example of such a mechanism.
5
  
The present paper contributes to this literature by identifying group identity, which is present 
under integration, as a significant factor that influences incentives for relation-specific 
investment. Consequently, our finding implies that when one evaluates the costs and benefits of 
integration, the effects of group identity should be considered along with other important factors 
such as property rights and reputation effects. 
2.2.  Social psychology and experimental economics research on group identity. 
Social psychologists trying to understand the psychological basis of inter-group discrimination 
have developed a social identity theory (Tajfel and Turner, 1979) that describes an individual’s 
concept of self as being derived from perceived memberships of social groups (Turner, Hogg, 
and Oakes, 1987). Early experimental work in psychology provided evidence for the main 
                                                             
5 Similarly, Gibbons (2005) argued that relational contracting is a promising area of future research for deepening 
the theory of the firm. These authors also discussed several other issues and concepts such as knowledge and its 
transfer as promising areas for future research. 
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prediction of the theory, namely that group membership will produce an in-group bias at the 
expense of the out-group (e.g., Tajfel, Billig, and Flament, 1971; Billig and Tajfel, 1973). These 
early studies were then followed by an extensive literature demonstrating the effects of group 
identity on behaviour and focusing on factors enhancing or diminishing in-group favoritism. A 
review of the social psychology literature on group identity can be found in Charness, Rigotti, 
and Rustichini (2007) and Chen and Li (2009).  
Economists have become increasingly interested in the notion of group identity, applying group 
identity models to various aspects of economic decision-making (e.g., Akerlof and Kranton, 
2000, 2002, 2005, and 2008; Basu, 2005, 2010; Chen and Li, 2008; Benabou and Tirole, 2011; 
Chen and Chen, 2011). In recent years there have been a number of economic experiments 
studying the interaction of group identities with human decision-making. Some experimental 
designs rely on natural identities within existing social groups (e.g., Bernhard, Fehr, and Fisch-
bacher, 2006; Goette, Huffman, and Meier, 2006; Falk and Zehnder, 2007; Tanaka, Camerer and 
Nguyen, 2008; List, Neilson, and Price, 2009; Chen, Li, Liu and Shih, 2010) while others use 
priming techniques from psychology, such as pre-game questionnaires (e.g., Brown-Kruse and 
Hummels, 1993; Cadsby and Maynes, 1998; Afridi, Li, and Ren, 2009; Benjamin, Choi, and 
Strickland, 2010; Cadsby, Servátka, and Song, 2012) or group composition (e.g., Cadsby, 
Servátka, and Song, 2010). A third category of experimental design induces group identities 
along the lines of Tajfel, Billig, and Flament (1971), called minimal group paradigm, rather than 
relying on existing ones.
6
 This approach allows the researcher to vary the strength of the induced 
identity (e.g., Eckel and Grossman, 2005) as well as to make it more likely that all subjects 
recognize their own and others’ group membership, resulting in more experimental control.  
The existing experimental literature that uses induced group identity provides evidence that 
group membership can affect subjects’ choices in both non-strategic and strategic environments. 
Chen and Li (2009) measure the effect of group identity on subjects’ other-regarding preferences 
                                                             
6 Whether an experimental procedure satisfies all conditions of the minimal group paradigm will always be 
questionable, in particular with economic experiments that almost always involve a link between a decision-
maker’s self-interest and his choices. For a further discussion, see Charness, Rigotti, and Rustichini (2007) whose 
findings also point out that a strong cohesion might be crucial for group identity effects to manifest themselves in 
a scenario with a hold-up problem . 
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in simple allocation games as well as in a series of two-person sequential games. The subjects’ 
choices display significant in-group favoritism in terms of (i) distributional preferences by giving 
more to an in-group member than an out-group member, (ii) preferences for reciprocity by 
rewarding an in-group member more often, but punishing less often, than an out-group member, 
and (iii) preferences for efficiency by choosing an action that maximizes social welfare when 
paired with an in-group member. Chen and Li’s study thus provides strong evidence that group 
membership affects other-regarding preferences – the underlying mechanism on which our 
conjecture that group membership mitigates the hold-up problem is based. 
2.3.  Experimental economics research on the hold-up problem. 
The studies mentioned above provide evidence for the fact that group influence and group identi-
ty can be important considerations in economic decision-making. The focus of our paper is more 
specific – we apply the idea of group identity to the theory of the firm and focus on the import-
ance of group membership in a particular strategic environment of the hold-up problem. Perhaps 
the most related experimental study from this area is Sloof, Oosterbeek, and Sonnemans (2007) 
who show that social preferences can increase investment in the hold-up problem. Various other 
aspects of the hold-up problem have already been explored experimentally, for example, the ex-
post process of negotiation and the ex-ante process of transaction-specific investment in anticipa-
tion of future surplus shares by Hackett (1994), the importance of threat points by Sonnemans, 
Oosterbeek, and Sloof (2001), and reliance levels of breach remedies by Sloof, Leuven, Ooster-
beek, and Sonnemans (2003), among others. Ellingsen and Johannesson (2004a and 2004b) pres-
ent experimental evidence that communication mitigates the lack of efficiency-enhancing invest-
ment, and the Hoppe and Schmitz (2011) study shows whether contracts can mitigate the hold-up 
problem when renegotiation cannot be prevented. One important aspect of the hold-up is the in-
completeness of the contract (e.g., Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006 and 2010; Fehr, Kremhelm-
er, and Schmidt, 2008; Dufwenberg, Smith, and Van Essen, forthcoming; Dufwenberg, Servátka, 
and Vadovič, 2012), commonplace in labor markets. A detailed survey of labor market experi-
ments is presented in Charness and Kuhn (2011). Even though this topic has been well explored, 
there are no previous experimental studies – to the best of our knowledge – on the effects of 
group identity on the hold-up problem or incomplete contracts. 
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3.  Hypotheses, experimental design and procedures. 
3.1.  Framework and hypotheses. 
Consider the following interaction between a seller and a buyer. At stage 1, the seller can make a 
fixed, non-contractible investment at the cost F. If the seller does not invest, the payoffs of the 
seller and the buyer are both zero. Suppose the seller invests; then there is a potential gain from 
trade G (> F). At stage 2, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer p to the seller to divide the 
gain G. If the seller accepts the offer p, the trade is realized and the total payoffs to the seller and 
the buyer are p – F and G – p, respectively. If the seller rejects the offer, there is no trade and the 
total payoffs to the seller and buyer are – F and 0, respectively. 
The simple model described above exhibits the hold-up problem, that is, inefficiency associated 
with non-contractible relation-specific investment, if agents care only about their own monetary 
payoff. To see this, suppose that the seller invests at cost F at stage 1. The buyer would then offer 
p = 0, which would be accepted by the seller under the tie-breaking assumption that the seller 
behaves in favor of the buyer when the seller is indifferent between accepting and rejecting it. 
This yields a negative total payoff of – F to the seller.7 Anticipating this, the seller does not 
invest at stage 1. The no-investment outcome is inefficient because G – F > 0.  
In reality, agents often behave in other-regarding ways.
 8
 In what follows, we argue that the hold-
up problem may be resolved when agents exhibit other-regarding preferences. Upon investment 
by the seller, the buyer would offer a strictly positive price because of his altruism and inequality 
aversion, even if the seller accepts any non-negative offer p ≥ 0. But the seller may in fact reject 
low price offers because of his own inequality aversion. This would work in the direction of 
further increasing the buyer’s offer, because by doing so the buyer can reduce the probability of 
rejection. Let pB (> 0) denote the buyer’s price offer made after the seller’s investment. Let us 
assume that the seller does not know the value of pB because different buyers have different 
degrees of other-regarding preferences, but knows that pB is distributed according to a certain 
distribution function. 
                                                             
7 Alternatively, the buyer would offer p =  > 0 (where  is the minimum monetary unit such as 1 cent), which would 
be accepted by the seller. This yields a negative total payoff of  – F to the seller.  
8 See Camerer (2003) and Cooper and Kagel (2010) for nice surveys on distributive other-regarding preferences.  
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Now consider the seller’s investment decision. We regard investment as the seller’s altruistic 
action because investment creates a surplus to be captured by the buyer, and hypothesize that, by 
choosing to invest, the seller enjoys a certain positive payoff (call it altruism payoff). Once 
invested, the seller accepts the buyer’s offer if it is perceived to be reasonably high, but rejects it 
otherwise due to inequality aversion. Let pS denote the minimum price offer that the seller would 
accept, where different sellers have different values of pS. The seller’s post-investment payoff is 
positive if pB > pS, where the payoff is increasing in pB and decreasing in pS. The seller will 
invest if his altruism payoff and expected post-investment payoff are sufficiently high compared 
to the investment cost F. Hence agents’ other-regarding preferences may resolve the hold-up 
problem.  
Previous research shows that group identity strengthens agents’ altruistic preferences towards 
group members (see, for example, Chen and Li, 2009).
9
 In our framework, this implies two 
things. First, group identity strengthens the seller’s altruism. We assume that different sellers 
have different levels of altruism payoff, and that group identity increases each seller’s altruism 
payoff. Second, group identity strengthens the buyer’s altruism and hence increases pB, the 
buyer’s price offer made upon the seller’s investment. We assume that group identity shifts the 
distribution of pB to the right, and so the seller anticipates that the buyer’s offer upon investment 
is more likely to be high. Hence the group identity increases the seller’s expected post-
investment payoff. 
Then, in the presence of group identity, the seller’s altruism payoff and expected post-investment 
payoff are more likely to be sufficiently high compared to the investment cost F so that the seller 
chooses to invest. This leads to our Hypothesis 1 below. Also, the second supposition mentioned 
above leads to Hypothesis 2. 
Hypothesis 1:  The seller is more likely to invest in the presence of group identity. 
Hypothesis 2:  Upon the seller’s investment, the buyer’s offer is higher in the presence of group 
identity. 
                                                             
9 Chen and Li found that their subjects displayed significant in-group favoritism in terms of distributional 
preferences. See Section 2.1 of the present paper for more details.  
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3.2.  Experiment design and procedures. 
The experiment took place in the New Zealand Experimental Economics Laboratory (NZEEL) at 
the University of Canterbury, with 258 undergraduate students serving as subjects. The 
participants were selected randomly from the NZEEL database using the ORSEE recruitment 
system (Greiner, 2004). The recruited subjects had never participated in an economic experiment 
at this university. An experimental session lasted 75 minutes on average, including the initial 
instruction period and the payment of subjects. The subjects earned on average of NZD 10.33 
(New Zealand dollars) from the game and up to NZD 4 from answering questions about trivia. 
At the end of the session the subjects completed a short survey on the experiment, for which they 
were paid NZD 5. This was not announced to the subjects at the start of the experiment.  
Upon entering the laboratory, all participants were randomly divided into the Orange and Yellow 
teams, based on the colour of the paper they drew from a large manila envelope. The subjects 
were then seated in cubicles, the Orange Team in the front two rows of the room and the Yellow 
Team in the back two rows. They were free to choose any seat within their two rows. The 
experimenters then handed subjects their team-colour t-shirts, representing team uniforms, and 
asked everyone to put them on.
10
 Next, we asked the teams to stand up and verify that all their 
teammates were wearing the same colour t-shirt. The use of jerseys or uniforms is a common 
way of strengthening group identity in the world outside the lab, and this is what prompted us to 
use the same-colour t-shirts in our experiment, rather than relying on other visible unifying signs. 
Our experiment included two treatments (Same-Team and Different-Team) based on the pairing 
of subjects, implemented in an across-subjects design in which each subject participates in one 
treatment only. Each treatment consisted of two tasks: (1) answering two questions about trivia 
and (2) playing the one-shot hold-up game. The two tasks were implemented as follows. 
The subjects were first given instructions to complete Task 1, which involved answering two 
questions about trivia. Prior to answering the questions, the subjects were given the opportunity 
to communicate via online chat for five minutes with their own team members (i.e., in both 
Same-Team and Different-Team treatments, a person on the Orange Team could chat with all 
remaining subjects on the Orange Team and a person on the Yellow Team could chat with all 
                                                             
10 The subjects were also told they could keep their t-shirts after the experiment was over. 
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remaining subjects on the Yellow Team) about providing and receiving help.
11
 After the chat 
was over, all subjects individually submitted their answers. The purpose of this task was to 
strengthen team identity. Research in social psychology on generalized reciprocity (e.g., 
Yamagashi and Kiyonari, 2000) suggests that team identity can be formed through a common 
goal and by helping other team members, and Eckel and Grossman (2005), Chen and Li (2009), 
and Chen and Chen (2011) provide experimental support for this hypothesis.  
Our experimental design thus includes three key features meant to induce team  identity: 
categorization of subjects (Yellow Team and Orange Team), usage of symbols (t-shirts), and 
cooperation to achieve the same goal (questions about trivia). As discussed in the Introduction, 
these are important means through which group identity is created and strengthened when two 
parties are integrated within the same organizational boundary.
12
 Note that the conjecture which 
we test in the experiment crucially hinges on a strong identification with the team. Therefore, we 
do not follow the minimal group paradigm but rather strive to create a team identity that is 
sufficiently strong to answer to our research question.
13
 
In the instructions to Task 1, subjects were told they would be paid NZD 2 for each correct 
answer, but would not find out the results until the end of the experiment. This was done to 
control for the level of created team identity that could vary in the event that an individual 
received poor advice from a team member. Once all subjects answered the questions about trivia, 
the experimenters collected their answer sheets.  
Next, instructions for Task 2, framed in a neutral fashion, were handed out. In the Same-Team 
treatment, subjects were informed that each person from the Yellow Team would be randomly 
paired with another person from the Yellow Team and each person from the Orange Team with 
                                                             
11 The chat was programmed and conducted with z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). 
12 Social psychology research shows that symbols -- visible manifestations of groups and organizations -- reinforce 
organizational or group identity and enhance cooperation among in-group members by differentiating them from 
out-group members. Symbols, such as dress or uniforms, provide a clear way of identifying group boundaries and 
thus allow for achieving the benefits of cooperation without the risk of excessive costs by limiting altruistic 
behaviour towards in-group members. Social psychologists describe ‘in-group’ as a bounded community of 
mutual and depersonalized expectations of cooperation. Such expectations motivate adherence to in-group norms 
and promote behaviour that ensures that one is recognized as an in-group member (Brewer, 1981 and 1999).  
13 Experiments reported in section 6 shed some light on the importance of the three group identity inducing design 
features.  
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another from the Orange Team. In the Different-Team treatment, subjects were informed that 
each person from the Yellow Team would be randomly paired with a person from the Orange 
Team. It was emphasized that no participant would learn the identity of the paired person and 
that the experimenters would keep track of all decisions using ID numbers. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The Hold-up Game 
 
A coin was publicly flipped to randomly determine the roles depending on the row in which a 
subject was sitting. The allocation of a seller (referred to as the First Mover in the instructions in 
order to induce a context-free decision-making environment, henceforth FM) and a buyer (the 
Second Mover, henceforth SM) to a particular pair was done by the experimenter based on a pre-
assigned matching that was unknown to the subjects. The decisions were divided into three 
stages. In Stage 1, the FM had to decide whether to invest his/her NZD 10 show-up fee in order 
Not Invest 
Invest 
10 
10 
p 
         p  
    24 – p 
0 14 
First Mover 
Second Mover 
Accept Reject 
       0 
      10 
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to create NZD 14 for the pair. If the FM decided not to invest the NZD 10 show-up fee, then no 
money was created and both movers kept their show-up fees. If the FM decided to invest, then 
NZD 14 was made available to split between the pair.  An offer of how to split the NZD 14 was 
determined by the SM in Stage 2. In Stage 3, the FM learned about the offer, and could either 
accept or reject it. If the FM accepted, both movers received the respective amounts stated in the 
offer. If the FM rejected, the NZD 14 disappeared and both the FM and the SM received NZD 0. 
(The SM still kept the show-up fee of NZD 10.) The parameterization of the hold-up game is 
presented in Figure 1. This game tree was not shown to the subjects. 
In order to minimize confusion of subjects in this three-stage task, we opted to include three con-
trol questions, which all participants had to answer correctly before proceeding to the decision-
making part of Task 2.
14
 The SM’s offers for the control questions were generated randomly for 
each session. After the subjects answered the questions, the experimenters verified their correct-
ness by inspecting each subject’s answers individually and, if necessary, provided additional 
assistance and explanation until the subject calculated all answers correctly. Then the three scen-
arios were reviewed publicly by the experimenter and correct answers projected on the screen.  
When the decision-making part of Task 2 started, subjects were reminded about their pairing –
either with another member of their own team or with someone from the other team, depending 
on the treatment. In order to transfer information between matched pairs, one of the experiment-
ers collected and later redistributed all decision sheets, while the second experimenter copied the 
decisions from one sheet to another. This procedure was implemented with the aim to prevent the 
exchange of superfluous information during the game and to maintain the anonymity of individu-
al decisions. 
At the end of the session, we asked subjects to complete a short post-experiment questionnaire 
and offered NZD 5 for doing so. This procedure ensured that no subject left the experiment with 
zero payoffs. Upon completion of the questionnaire, the correct answers from Task 1 were 
revealed and all subjects were privately paid their earnings for the session. 
 
                                                             
14 The control questions along with subject instructions are provided in the appendix. 
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4.  Results. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics from our two treatments. Forty-nine subject pairs participat-
ed in the Same-Team treatment. In Stage 1, twenty-one FMs invested, yielding an investment 
rate of 43.8%. Following an investment, SMs offered on average NZD 10.38 in Stage 2. Two of 
these offers (NZD 5 and 8) were rejected in Stage 3 by the respective FMs, resulting in a 
rejection rate of 9.5% and a rejected average offer of NZD 6.50. 
Due to a lower investment rate in the Different-Team treatment, we had to run more subjects in 
order to generate sufficient and balanced across treatments number of observations on SMs’ 
behaviour. Out of eighty-one FMs who participated in this treatment, twenty-one invested while 
the remaining sixty did not, yielding an investment rate of 25.9%. Following an investment, the 
twenty-one SMs who got to make a decision offered on average NZD 8.74. Four offers were 
rejected (NZD 2, 3.50, 6, and 7) resulting in a rejection rate of 19% and a rejected average offer 
of NZD 4.63. The distributions of all offers in both treatments are presented graphically in 
Figure 2. 
Table 1.  Summary Statistics. 
 Same-Team Treatment Different-Team Treatment 
Number of subject pairs 48 81 
Investment rate 21/48 = 43.8% 21/81 = 25.9% 
Average offer 10.38 8.74 
Median offer 12 10 
Rejection rate 2/21 = 9.5% 4/21 = 19% 
Average rejected offer 6.50 4.63 
 
 
Hypothesis 1 states that the FM (seller) is more likely to invest in the presence of group identity. 
To test the hypothesis we compare the investment rates of FMs in our two treatments. The one-
 15 
 
sided Fisher’s exact test reveals that the investment rate in the Same-Team treatment is 
significantly higher than in the Different-Team treatment (p = 0.036), suggesting that team 
membership mitigates the inefficiency related to the relationship-specific nature of investment. 
Hypothesis 2 states that upon the FM’s investment, the SM’s (buyer’s) offer is higher in the 
presence of group identity. The reason behind this increase is a higher level of SM’s altruism 
induced by group identity. To test this second hypothesis, we compare the offers made by SMs to 
their counterpart FMs in both treatments. The one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test detects that the 
offers in the Same-Team treatment were significantly higher than in the Different-Team 
treatment (p = 0.012). In the Same-Team treatment, FMs who invested made an average profit of 
NZD 0.38, whereas in the Different-Team treatment, they made an average loss of NZD 1.26. 
This result provides further support for our conjecture that group identity mitigates hold-up by 
strengthening agents’ other-regarding preferences. 
 
 
Figure 2. Distributions of Offers 
 
Finally, some of the buyers’ offers were rejected, as reported above. Our theoretical framework 
does not yield an unambiguous prediction concerning the relationship between rejection rates 
and group identity.
15
 While it seems interesting to explore effects of group identity on rejection 
                                                             
15 Our framework predicts that a larger fraction of FMs invest in the presence of group identity (Hypothesis 1). This 
means that some FMs with relatively high values of minimum acceptable price offers (pS) would invest in the 
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rates, such a study is beyond the scope of the present paper, which focuses on testing whether 
group identity helps resolve the hold-up problem.      
 
5.  Further explorations.  
In this section we shed some light on the importance of the group identity inducing features used 
in our design. We present two additional experiments: in the first one the group identity was 
induced by categorization and symbols only while in the second experiment no group identity 
was induced at all. 
5.1.  Group identity induced by symbols. 
Social psychology research shows that symbols, such as dress or uniforms, play an important 
role in reinforcing group identity and enhancing cooperation among in-group members by 
differentiating them from out-group members.
16
 From this point of view it is possible that 
categorization and the use of t-shirts could be sufficient to induce group identity strong enough 
to mitigate the hold-up problem. We tested this in a new experiment in which Task 1 was absent 
(i.e., there were no questions about trivia and online chat) and in which after receiving t-shirts 
subjects immediately proceeded to playing the hold-up game. In all other respects the procedures 
were identical to those of the main experiment described in the previous sections.  
We recruited 232 new subjects whose behaviour is presented in Table 2. Fifty-four subject pairs 
participated in the Same-Team treatment. In Stage 1, twenty FMs invested, yielding an invest-
ment rate of 37%. Following an investment SMs offered on average NZD 8.55 in Stage 2. Only 
one of these offers (NZD 6) was rejected in Stage 3 by the respective FM, resulting in a rejection 
rate of 5%.  
Sixty-two subject pairs participated in the Different-Team treatment. In Stage 1, sixteen FMs 
invested, yielding an investment rate of 25.8%. Following an investment SMs offered on average 
                                                                                                                                                                                                    
presence of group identity. Hence, group identity, even though it shifts the distribution of pB to the right, may 
increase or decrease the rejection rate. 
16 There exists a vast literature studying roles of uniforms and organizational dress in symbolizing values and beliefs 
of an organization, conveying identity, and asserting organizational control and compliance (see for example 
Joseph and Alex, 1972; Joseph, 1986; de Marley, 1986; Davis, 1992; Roach-Higgins and Eicher, 1992; Rafaeli 
and Pratt 1993; Rafaeli, Dutton, Harquail ,and Mackie-Lewis, 1997 and for a nice survey of this literature Pratt 
and Rafaeli, 1997). 
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NZD 7.75 in Stage 2. Two of these offers (both NZD 4) were rejected in Stage 3 by the respect-
ive FM, resulting in a rejection rate of 12.5%.  
Just as before we first test whether the group identity created by t-shirts was strong enough to 
induce FMs to invest more often when paired with their team members as opposed to members 
of the other team. While the investment rate in the Same-Team treatment is higher than in the 
Different-Team treatment, the one-sided Fisher’s exact test reveals that the difference is 
marginally insignificant (p = 0.135).  
Second, we compare whether upon the FM’s investment, the SM’s offer is higher in the presence 
of group identity induced by the use of t-shirts. The one-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test detects no 
statistical difference between offers in the Same-Team and Different-Team treatments (p = 
0.282). In both of these treatments FMs who invested lost money on average (NZD 1.45 and 
NZD 2.25 in the Same-Team and Different-Team treatment, respectively), unlike in our main 
experiment where FMs in Same-Team treatment made on average NZD 0.38. This result 
suggests that group identity induced by categorization and t-shirts was not strong enough to 
sufficiently strengthen subjects’ other-regarding preferences to mitigate the hold-up problem.  
5.2.  A between-experiment comparison: The effect of cooperation on creating group 
identity. 
In this subsection we compare the behaviour of subjects between the two experiments. Any 
resulting differences are due to varying strength of group identity. In the Same-Team treatments 
the investment rate is higher when chat is included (43.8% vs. 37%), however the Fisher one-
sided test does not detect such increase to be significant (p = 0.344). In Different-Team 
treatments the investment rate has not changed at all (25.9% vs. 25.8% in the experiment with 
chat and without, respectively). This result suggests that it is both t-shirts and chat together that 
are jointly responsible for the high investment rate in the Same-Team treatment of the main 
experiment. Note that the no change in investment rate in the Different-Team treatments is in 
line with Brewer (1999) who remarks that in-group favoritism does not have to be accompanied 
by out-group discrimination. 
On the other hand, including chat has significantly increased the average offers in the Same-
Team treatment (NZD 10.38 vs. NZD 8.55 in the experiment with chat and without, respectively; 
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p = 0.014), but not in the Different-Team treatment (8.74 vs. 7.75; p = 0.234). This result 
suggests that it is mainly the cooperation in the team chat that is responsible for the higher 
investment rate in the Same-Team treatment of the main experiment.  
We conclude with a remark that the findings from our between-experiment comparison are 
consistent with the everyday practice observed in the field where organizations often make 
significant investments in team-building and socialization activities such as company retreats and 
Christmas parties. Our findings thus suggest that an important objective of such activities might 
be to strengthen group identity so that it is effective even in highly strategic environments. 
 
Table 2. Subject Behaviour in the ‘T-shirt Only’ Experiment 
 Same-Team Treatment Different-Team Treatment 
Number of subject pairs 54 62 
Investment rate 20/54 = 37% 16/62 = 25.8% 
Average offer 8.55 7.75 
Median offer 8.50 8 
Rejection rate 1/20 = 5% 2/16 = 12.5% 
Average rejected offer 6 4 
 
5.3.  Hold-up game with no group identity. 
To what extent does group identity increase altruism within the team? Does team membership 
lead to out-group discrimination in our setup? To provide answers to these questions we run a 
neutral baseline experiment in which there were no teams and in which subjects played the hold-
up game with a randomly and anonymously paired participant (who was not identified by the 
colour of the t-shirt.) Comparing the investment rates and offers in the Same-Team treatment of 
our main experiment with such baseline will allow us to separate out the incremental impact of 
group identity on altruistic behaviour within the team. On the other hand, the comparison of the 
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Different-Team treatment with the baseline will highlight any discrimination against members of 
the other team. 
17
 
We recruited additional 134 subjects whose behaviour is presented in Table 3. In Stage 1, 
twenty-one out of sixty-seven FMs invested, yielding an investment rate of 31.3%. Following an 
investment SMs offered on average NZD 8.48 in Stage 2. Three of these offers (all equal to NZD 
5) were rejected in Stage 3 by the respective FM, resulting in a rejection rate of 14.3%.  
First, we focus on the impact of team membership. While we observe that the investment rate of 
the FMs in the Same-Team treatments is higher than in the baseline (43.8% vs. 31.3%), this 
increase is marginally insignificant (p = 0.122). As for the SMs, team membership increased 
their offers by NZD 1.90 comparing to the baseline. This increase is statistically significant (p = 
0.034). 
 
Table 3.  Subject Behaviour in the ‘Baseline’ Experiment. 
 No-Team 
Number of subject pairs 67 
Investment rate 21/67 = 31.3% 
Average offer 8.48 
Median offer 8 
Rejection rate 3/21 = 14.3% 
Average rejected offer 5 
 
 
Next we test for out-group discrimination. While being on a different team appears to decrease 
the investment rate comparing to the baseline (31.3% vs. 25.9%, respectively), such decrease is 
not significant (p = 0.293). As for the SMs, being on a different team insignificantly increases 
their offers comparing to the baseline (p=0.435), providing no evidence of out-group discrimina-
                                                             
17 We thank an anonymous referee for suggesting this experiment. 
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tion in our setting. 
18  
If one considers all the presented results jointly, it is the combination of 
strong group identity induced by the use of t-shirts and team chat with a slight discrimination 
towards out-group members that makes our investment rate results in the main experiment 
significant.  
 
6.  Concluding remarks. 
Group identity helps resolve or mitigate the hold-up problem by strengthening agents’ altruistic 
preferences. We have presented experimental evidence showing that under team membership, 
the investment rates as well as offers in the hold-up game increase, thus supporting our conjec-
ture. This finding suggests that group identity should be an important consideration when one 
compares the costs and benefits of integration. In order to isolate the effects of group identity, we 
have abstracted away from other important factors, such as property rights, that affect incentives 
for relation-specific investment. In our framework, integration can be beneficial when it creates 
and strengthens group identity, whereas we do not study the cost of integration. We also abstract 
away from other psychological factors caused, for example, by a hostile takeover or conflict of 
corporate cultures, which could affect performance after integration and cause a merger to fail 
(Weber and Camerer, 2003).  
We have developed our conjecture based on an assumption that agents exhibit other-regarding 
behaviour. In our set-up, we can observe investment if the FM is unconditionally altruistic and 
cares about the final distribution of monetary payoffs (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and 
Ockenfells, 2000; Cox and Sadiraj, 2007), has preferences for social efficiency (Charness and 
Rabin, 2002), and/or trusts that the SM will split the created surplus in a “fair” way (Berg, Dick-
haut, and McCabe, 1995). The SM, on the other hand, shares the surplus if he is unconditionally 
and/or conditionally altruistic (i.e., reciprocal as in models of Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 
2004; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad, 2007; and Cox, Friedman, and 
Sadiraj, 2008) or guilt-averse (Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007). Cox (2004), Cox and Deck 
(2005), and Cox, Sadiraj, and Sadiraj (2008) present experiments which separate trust and 
                                                             
18 For completeness we also provide a comparison of the baseline with the ‘t-shirt only’ experiment: The increase in 
investment rate caused by team membership was insignificant (p = 0.321) and so was the increase in offers 
(p=0.495).  Being on a different team insignificantly decreased the investment rate (p = 0.309) as well as the offers 
(p = 0.485). 
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reciprocity from unconditionally altruistic preferences in various settings. Similarly, it is possible 
to design an experiment that would identify the effects of group identity on different types of 
other-regarding behaviour in the context of the hold-up game. Such a study, however, is left for 
future research. In the present paper, we have focused on investigating whether group identity 
has the potential to resolve the hold-up problem. 
We believe that an interesting extension of our work would be a study of interaction between 
group identity and property rights that would shed light on both the costs and benefits of integra-
tion in the presence of group identity. Below we outline one simple way to incorporate the inter-
action based on the formulation devised by Baker, Gibbons, and Murphy (2002). Consider a 
model consisting of a seller, a buyer, and an asset. The seller may use the asset to produce a 
good. The buyer values the good, but the good also has an alternative use. Ownership of the asset 
conveys ownership of the good produced using the asset. That is, if the buyer owns the asset, 
then he could simply take the good, refusing to pay the seller anything, whereas if the seller 
owns the asset, then he could cosign the good to its alternative use. The asset is owned by the 
buyer when the two parties are integrated, while it is owned by the seller when they are not 
integrated.  
In this set-up, consider the interaction between the seller and the buyer similar to the one 
presented in Subsection 3.1. If the seller invests F, he produces a good that has value G (> F) for 
the buyer. Under integration, the good belongs to the buyer, who provides p to the seller. In 
contrast, under non-integration, the buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer p to the seller. If the 
seller accepts p, then the buyer obtains the good, while if the seller rejects p, he sells the good to 
an alternative use at the price of A (< G). At the same time, assume that both the seller and the 
buyer have other-regarding preferences.    
The set-up outlined above can potentially capture the costs and benefits of integration, which not 
only strengthens group identity between the two parties but also transfers the ownership of the 
asset (and the good produced upon investment) from the seller to the buyer. This trade-off can be 
incorporated in our experimental design by interpreting the Same-Team treatment as integration 
and the Different-Team treatment as non-integration, just as in the current paper.  
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Appendix I.  Subject Instructions and Decision Forms. 
[These instructions were handed out at the beginning of the experiment] 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
 
No Talking Allowed  
Thank you for coming.  The purpose of this session is to study how people make decisions in a particular 
situation.  From now until the end of the session, unauthorized communication of any nature with other 
participants is prohibited.  If you violate this rule we will have to exclude you from the experiment and 
from all payments.  If you have a question after we finish reading the instructions, please raise your hand 
and the experimenter will approach you and answer your question in private.  
Two Tasks 
You will be asked to participate in two tasks during the experiment. The instructions for Task 2 will be 
given to you after finishing Task 1. Your earnings from both tasks will be paid to you in cash at the end of 
the experiment. 
 
Two Teams 
You have been divided randomly into two teams, called the Yellow Team and the Orange Team.  People 
from both teams are wearing their respective team uniforms:  The Yellow Team is wearing yellow t-shirts 
and the Orange Team is wearing orange t-shirts. 
 
 
TASK 1 INSTRUCTIONS 
Task 1 Earnings 
Below you have received two trivia questions.  For each correct answer, you will be rewarded with $2.  
Meanwhile, you can use a computerized team chat program to get help from or offer help to other 
members on your own team.  Except for the following restrictions, you can type whatever you want in 
the lower box of the chat program.  Messages will be shared only among all the members from your 
own team. You will not be able to see the messages exchanged within the other team.  People on the 
other team will not see the messages exchanged within your own team either.  You will learn the correct 
answers and your earnings from Task 1 at the end of today’s session. 
 
Restrictions on Messages 
1. Please do not identify yourself or send any information that could be used to identify you (e.g. age, 
race, professional background, etc.). 
2. Please refrain from using obscene or offensive language. 
 
How to Use the Chat Program 
When asked by the experimenter, please enter the colour of your team on the initial screen of the chat 
program.  You will be given 5 minutes to communicate with your team members. Are there any 
questions? 
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TASK 1 DECISIONS 
 
Please answer the following two trivia questions.  For each correct answer, you will be rewarded with 
$2.  You can also use a team chat program to get help from or offer help to other members on your own 
team. 
 
Trivia 1: [text here] 
 
 
 
YOUR ANSWER: ……………………………………… 
 
 
Trivia 2: [text here] 
 
 
 
YOUR ANSWER: ……………………………………… 
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[These are Task 2 instructions that were handed out after completing Task 1.] 
TASK 2 INSTRUCTIONS 
Earnings 
In Task 2, every participant will get $10 as a show up fee. Your final experimental earnings will depend on 
your decisions and on the decisions of others. 
 
Anonymity 
Each person from the Yellow Team will be randomly paired with another person from the Yellow Team.  
Each person from the Orange Team will be randomly paired with another person from the Orange Team.  
No one will learn the identity of the person (s)he is paired with.  Your role and your ID number will be 
written on the top of your decision sheet.  The experimenters will keep track of your decisions and your 
paired person’s decisions by your ID numbers.  Because your decision is private, we ask that you do not tell 
anyone your decision or your earnings either during or after the experiment. 
 
Pairing and Roles 
Within each pair, one person is going to be randomly assigned to be the First Mover and the other person to 
be the Second Mover.  The decisions are divided into three stages: 
 
Stage 1: The First Mover’s Investment Decision 
The First Mover decides whether or not to invest his/her $10 show up fee in order to create $14 for the 
pair: 
 If the First Mover invests his/her $10 show up fee, then $14 will be made available to split between 
the two paired persons.  The split of $14 will be determined by the Second Mover. 
 
 If the First Mover does not invest, then no money is created and stages 2 and 3 are cancelled. 
 
Stage 2: The Second Mover’s Offer 
If the First Mover invested in Stage 1, the Second Mover decides how much money out of $14 to offer to 
the First Mover and how much of it to keep. 
 
Stage 3: The First Mover’s Acceptance/Rejection 
The First Mover learns about the offer, and either accepts it or rejects it.  If the First Mover accepts, both 
movers receive the respective amounts stated in the offer.  If the First Mover rejects, the $14 disappears 
and both the First Mover and the Second Mover get $0. (The Second Mover still keeps his/her show up fee 
of $10.) 
 
Payment of Experimental Earnings 
Once all participants have made their decisions, the experimenters will collect the decision forms and 
calculate the payoffs.  Then you will be asked one by one to approach the experimenter in the hallway 
for the payment of your experimental earnings.  Once paid, please leave using the stairs and do not 
gather in front of the elevator. 
 
Are there any questions? 
 31 
 
Practice Questions 
 
Please answer the following questions: 
 
1. If the First Mover invests and the Second Mover offers …. which is accepted by the First Mover, what 
are the First Mover’s final earnings? ………… 
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? ………….. 
 
2.  If the First Mover invests and the Second Mover offers …. which is rejected by the First Mover, what 
are the First Mover’s final earnings? ………… 
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? ………….. 
 
3. If the First Mover does not invest what are the First Mover’s final earnings? ………… 
What are the Second Mover’s final earnings? ………….. 
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Decision Form          First Mover # 
Stage 1: THE FIRST MOVER’S INVESTMENT DECISION 
The First Mover makes his/her decision by circling (1) or (2): 
(1) I choose not to invest my $10 show up fee 
OR 
(2) I choose to invest my $10 show up fee 
 
 
Stage 2: THE SECOND MOVER’S OFFER 
The paired First Mover chose to invest the $10 show up fee. Therefore, $14 is made available for the 
Second Mover to split between the two paired persons. The Second Mover makes his/her decision how 
much money out of $14 to offer to the First Mover by completing both statements below: 
I offer $_____________ to the paired First Mover. 
Therefore, I will keep $_____________ for myself. 
 
If no investment was made in Stage 1 the Second Mover writes “No investment” in the space below: 
_____________ 
 
 
Stage 3: THE FIRST MOVER’S ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION 
The First Mover makes his/her decision by circling (A) or (R): 
(A) I accept the Second Mover’s offer.  
OR 
(R) I reject the Second Mover’s offer. 
 
If no investment was made in Stage 1 the First Mover writes “No investment” in the space below: 
_____________ 
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Decision Form                      Second Mover # 
Stage 1: THE FIRST MOVER’S INVESTMENT DECISION 
The First Mover makes his/her decision by circling (1) or (2): 
(1) I choose not to invest my $10 show up fee 
OR 
(2) I choose to invest my $10 show up fee 
 
 
Stage 2: THE SECOND MOVER’S OFFER 
The paired First Mover chose to invest the $10 show up fee. Therefore, $14 is made available for the 
Second Mover to split between the two paired persons. The Second Mover makes his/her decision how 
much money out of $14 to offer to the First Mover by completing both statements below: 
I offer $_____________ to the paired First Mover. 
Therefore, I will keep $_____________ for myself. 
 
If no investment was made in Stage 1 the Second Mover writes “No investment” in the space below: 
_____________ 
 
 
Stage 3: THE FIRST MOVER’S ACCEPTANCE/REJECTION 
The First Mover makes his/her decision by circling (A) or (R): 
(A) I accept the Second Mover’s offer.  
OR 
(R) I reject the Second Mover’s offer. 
 
If no investment was made in Stage 1 the First Mover writes “No investment” in the space below: 
_____________ 
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Appendix II. Questions about Trivia 
[The trivia questions for each session were selected without replacement from the following trivia bank.] 
 
 
TRIVIA BANK 
What is Oktoberfest intended to celebrate? 
Hudson Bay is a large inland sea in which country? 
What country was the 1986 Soccer World Cup held at? 
What is the name of the three bones that make up a human finger? 
Which art movement, founded in a Zurich café during World War I and consolidated at a meeting held  
During the Cold War, what Eastern European alliance was the equivalent of NATO? 
What does the "E" stand for in UNESCO? 
In the southern hemisphere, the winds associated with a cyclone, a region of low pressure, blow in 
which direction? 
In the northern hemisphere, the winds associated with a cyclone, a region of low pressure, blow in 
which direction? 
What is the name of the index of average daily prices on the New York Stock Exchange? 
What determines the sex of crocodile embryos? 
What elemental event rejuvenates a prairie by causing more plants to grow taller, flower and produce 
seed? 
Who was the first female to register 30 top ten hits? 
What is Europe's most mountainous (in % of total area) country? 
What's the second most populous continent? 
What's the University of Paris more commonly called? 
What European country uses its Latin name, Helvetia, on its stamps? 
What city boasts the largest Greek population in the world outside of Greece? 
What South American capital's name means "I saw the mountain"? 
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Croatia and Slovenia used to be part of which country? 
Which country hosted the 1998 Winter Olympics? 
What country is only bordered by Spain? 
In which country was the Titanic launched? 
The island of Rhodes belongs to which Mediterranean country? 
Which country is also called the Hellenic Republic? 
What weather phenomenon is measured by the Beaufort scale? 
 
 
 
 
